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NOTES AND COMMENT
the existing rate structure to be revised upward. This clearly per-
mits the carrier to make use of released rates as a means of escaping
liability for the consequences of its negligence in direct contravention
of the avowed declarations of the Commission in In Re Released
Rates.51 This condition prevails because as an administrative mat-
ter, the subject of limitation of liability under released rates authority
is separate from the subject of the reasonableness per se of the rates
involved. Unless existing rates are held in force by outstanding
orders of the Commission, carriers are free, by filing tariffs with the
Commission in accordance with Section 6 of the Act, to initiate such
changes in the measure of those rates as they consider that they are
prepared to justify.52 Orders granting released rates authority do
not constitute approval of the measure of rates filed pursuant to the
released rate authority.5 3 Such rates, or any changes therein, are
subject, as in the case of any proposed changes in unreleased rates, to
protest and suspension under the provisions of Section 15(7) of the
Act.54 Clearly, this procedure should be amended in order to compel
the carrier to set forth and justify its proposed rates at the very time
that it applies for a released rate order. Also, any subsequent change
of rates should be considered by the Commission before publication
with reference to the previously obtained release rate authority.
ANTHONY J. DImINO.
COST-PLUS-A-PERCENTAGE-OF-COST SYSTEM OF CONTRACTING
During World War I, the Government made extensive use of
the cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost system of contracting as a means of
inducing contractors who lacked production experience to accept or-
ders for manufacturing new types of war material. The results
attained vindicated the use of this system as a means for rapidly
increasing production; however, from a financial viewpoint, the re-
sulting costs were excessive.
Under the cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost (hereinafter referred to
as CPPC) contracts, the fee or profit of the contractor is dependent
on the cost of the work; the amount of the fee automatically adjusts
itself to variations in costs resulting from changing conditions and
requirements during performance. Thus, under a CPPC contract
providing for a profit of 7%, if the costs amounted to $100,000, the
-1 See note 6 supra.52 See U. S. C. A. tit. 49.
53 A typical released rate order (No. 1077, dated May 6, 1944) states in
part, "The Commission does not hereby approve the lawfulness, except under
Sections 20(11) and 219 of the Interstate Commerce Act, of any rates which
may be filed under this authority."
54 See U. S. C. A. tit. 49.
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contractor would earn a profit of $7,000. However, if the costs were
increased to $150,000 his profit under the contract would amount to
$10,500. It is self-evident that under this class of contracts, it is to
the contractor's financial interest to have the cost of the work run
high. In practice, it was found there was no incentive to the contrac-
tor to reduce costs other than the contractor's personal satisfaction in
doing a job well or as a possible means for enhancing his reputation.
In order to remedy this defect, the Government developed the
cost-plus-a-fixed-fee (hereinafter referred to is CPFF) contract.
Although both types of contracts are similar in that they guarantee
reimbursement for all necessary and reasonable costs incurred in the
performance of the work, the two types differ materially in the com-
putation of the profit. Under the CPFF type of contract, the fee is
set in advance based on a percentage of the estimated cost of per-
formance. The fee is, therefore, not affected by variations in actual
costs, but only by changes in the scope of the work. Inasmuch as the
fee for each CPFF contract is fixed, it is to the contractor's advan-
tage to prosecute the work efficiently so as to be in a position to under-
take additional contracts.
At the start of the present emergency, Congress officially recog-
nized the inherent defect in the CPPC system of contracting and, for
the first time, took steps to prevent its further use by the Government.
Beginning with the Act of June 28, 1940,1 which extended the
authority of the Secretary of Navy by permitting the negotiation of
contracts for the acquisition and repair of naval vessels and aircraft,
Congress provided that "The cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost system of
contracting shall not be used under the authority granted by this para-
graph to negotiate contracts."
In the Act of July 2, 1940,2 which authorized the Secretary of
War to negotiate contracts for necessary Army defense facilities,
Congress provided that "The cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost system of
contracting shall not be used under this section."
Similarly in the Act of May 2, 1941,3 which authorized the U. S.
Maritime Commission to negotiate contracts, Congress provided that
"The cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost system of contracting shall not be
used under the authority to negotiate contracts granted by subsection
(a) hereof."
After the outbreak of World War II, the First War Powers
Act 4 was passed. This Act in extending the emergency powers of
the President contained a limitation which provided that "Nothing
herein shall be construed to authorize the use of the cost-plus-a-
percentage-of-cost system of contracting."
1 54 STAT. 676, 50 U. S. C. A. § 1152 (1940).
2 54 STAT. 712, 50 U. S. C. A. § 1171 (1940).
3 55 STAT. 148, 50 U. S. C. A. § 1261 (1941).
4 55 STAT. 839, 50 U. S. C. A. § 611 (1941).
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The President's emergency powers were further extended by the
Second War Powers Act,5 which also contained a similar limitation
which stated that "The cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost system of con-
tracting shall not be used under the authority granted by this para-
graph to negotiate contracts."
In accordance with the provisions of these statutes, Government
contracting agencies discontinued the letting of prime contracts on a
CPPC basisY However, prior to 1942, no regulations were issued
by the Government contracting agencies applying this limitation to
subcontracts entered into by Government prime contractors and, there-
fore, many prime contractors entered into subcontracts on a CPPC
basis when such basis was deemed reasonable and necessary under
the particular circumstances. This was especially true in the build-
ing construction field, where the CPPC system of contracting was a
customary commercial practice.
The question as to whether the inhibition upon the Government
contracting agencies in entering into contracts on a CPPC basis
applied to subcontracts was first raised March 13, 1942 by the Comp-
troller General's Decision B-23293.7 The War Department, under
the authority granted by the Act of July 2, 1940, entered into a CPFF
prime contract with Day and Zimmerman, Inc., a building contractor.
The latter entered into a cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost subcontract,
amounting to $150,194.19, with the Western-Electro-Mechanical Co.,
Inc. The Comptroller General ruled that subcontracts on a cost-
plus-a-percentage-of-cost basis were in contravention of the spirit
and purpose of the Act of July 2, 1940. He stated that it was evi-
dent that the prohibition against this form of contracting could be
substantially evaded and the purposes thereof defeated, were it not
applied to the performance of that part of the contract work sublet
by the prime contractors. It was therefore ruled that since the sub-
contract provided for payment on a CPPC basis, such agreement
could not be regarded as creating any binding obligation on the Gov-
ernment to reimburse the prime contractor for any payments made
to the subcontractor.
This case was resubmitted to the Comptroller General for per-
mission to settle the claim on a quqntum meruit basis. The Comp-
troller General, in Decision B-23293, dated February 11, 1943,8 denied
the claim, stating that the CPPC subcontract made the contract un-
enforceable, and that no contract may be implied where a statute
positively prohibits the transaction. The opinion points out that what
556 STAT. 176, 50 U. S. C. A. § 633 (1942).
6 On December 27, 1941, the President of the United States, by Executive
Order No. 9001, delegated to the War Department, the Navy Department, and
the United States Maritime Commission, the authority conferred upon him by
the First War Powers Act, with the limitation that "Nothing herein shall be
construed to authorize the cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost system of contracting."
721 Comp'. GEN. 858 (1942).8 22 ComP. GEN. 784 (1943).
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Congress provided against was not merely a CPPC contract, but a
"cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost system of contracting". It was there-
fore concluded that the United States is neither bound nor estopped
by acts of officers or agents in entering into, approving, or purporting
to authorize agreements prohibited by law, even though it appears
that the Government may have benefited thereby; and general prin-
ciples of equity will not be applied to frustrate the purpose of such
laws or to thwart public policy.
To date, the question of whether the inhibitions against the use
of the CPPC system of contracting by Government contracting officers
apply to subcontracts entered into by prime contractors has not been
decided by the courts. It is the opinion of the writer, however, that
when the question is judicially decided, the Comptroller General's
ruling will be reversed.
The various statutes in point refer only to the extent of the
authority of Government contracting officers and are without refer-
ence to the second party prime contractor or the third party sub-
contractor. When a subcontract is entered into by the latter two
parties, the Government does not thereby become a prime party to
the subcontract. The Comptroller General's decision is apparently
based upon the assumption that a prime contractor is in the nature of
an agent of the Government and that an inhibition upon a Govern-
ment contracting officer would therefore apply to the prime contrac-
tor. However, there is ample authority to disprove any such rela-
tionship. The Supreme Court of the United States has ruled that a
prime contractor is an independent contractor and is not an agent of
the Government. 9 In view of the Supreme Court's decision, it fol-
lows that limitations on the authority of the Government's contracting
officers do not, in the absence of express statutory provisions, impose
like limitations on the second party prime contractor in making sub-
contracts with third party subcontractors. There is no agency rela-
tionship between the prime contractor and the Government, and
therefore there is no privity between the Government and the sub-
contractors.
The emergency acts refer only to the powers and limitations of
the contracting officers of the Government and do not make any ref-
erence to methods of subcontracting. In the absence of a specific
reference to subcontracts, what right have we to assume that these
acts limit the rights of an independent contractor to exercise his dis-
cretion in subcontracting? In those instances where Congress in-
tended provisions of the emergency acts to extend to subcontracts,
specific provision was made therefor. Thus, Section 403 of the Sixth
Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act of 1942,10 in di-
recting the renegotiation of excessive profits under war contracts,
9 Curry v. United States, 314 U. S. 14, 86 L. Ed. 9 (1941) ; Alabama v.
King and Boozer et al., 314 U. S. 1, 86 L. Ed. 3 (1941).
10 Punaic LAw 235, 78th Cong., enacted Feb. 25, 1944: PUBLIc LAW 528,
77th Cong., as amended by § 701(b) of the Revenue Act of 1943.
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specifically provides that its terms are to apply not only to prime con-
tracts but also to subcontracts.
In the Day and Zimnernuz decision, the Comptroller General
develops the opinion that CPPC subcontracts are inherently illegal,
therefore it is of no consequence that the cost of the equipment fur-
nished was audited and certified by the War Department as reason-
able and just and no greater than would have been paid and reim-
bursed by the Government, had any other method been used. In
support of this contention various cases involving usury, restraint of
trade, etc., are quoted indicating that no court of justice can in its
nature be made the handmaid of inequity, hence that there can be no
legal remedy for that which is itself illegal.
A review of the history of cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost system
of contracting reveals that there has never been a blanket prohibition
of its use, nor has it been declared illegal as such. Congress has
merely provided that the CPPC system of contracting shall not be
used in the exercise of the additional contracting powers granted to
Government officials under the various emergency acts. No mention
is made of subcontracts. Government contracting officers entering
into contracts under acts other than those specifically denying the
right to use the CPPC system of contracting, have the right to con-
tinue its use, even at the present time.
The theory that the CPPC system of contracting is inherently
illegal appears to be contradicted in a subsequent decision of the
Comptroller General, B-38322.1 This case involved a prime con-
tract entered into by the War Department, under authority of the Act
of July 2, 1940, with the Blumenthal-Kahn Electric Co., providing
for reimbursement on a cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost basis subject to
a maximum price of $6,000. The final charge to the Government
was $4,403.76, of which amount $4,046.49 represented the cost to the
contractor and $357.27 represented profit. The Comptroller General
held that "The evident purpose of the Congress in prohibiting con-
tracts on a cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost basis is to avoid the evils
which might flow from a situation whereby a contractor could pur-
posely cause tremendous increase in the cost of work in order to in-
crease its profits proportionately. Such a situation obviously could
not arise in connection with performance of the instant contract in
view of the stipulated 'ceiling' or maximum price and the definite and
effective controls over the labor and materials to be utilized in the
performance of the contract."
It is interesting to note that in the Day am! Zimmerman, decision,
no weight whatsoever was given to the statements made by the War
Department that adequate controls had been exercised in ascertaining
that the cost of the subcontract therein involved was reasonable and
in the best interests of the Government. The only difference in the
two cases was the existence of a ceiling price in the Blumenthal-Kahn
1123 ComP. GEN. 410 (1943).
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case. What then is the significance of this factor? A "ceiling"
price in a CPPC contract serves only as a means of assuring that the
final cost will not be unreasonable. The cost of a contract could be
reasonable, however (and was agreed to be reasonable in the Day
and Zimnerat decision), whether it has a maximum price or not.
Conversely, of course, the cost of a contract could be unreasonable
even if there were a "ceiling" price if the "ceiling" had been set too
high.
The writer questions the theory that the presence of a maximum
price converts a CPPC prime contract, which otherwise would be in
contravention of the statute, into an acceptable form. In United
States v. 94.68 Acres of Land, St. Chas. Co., Mo., 1 2 the court re-
jected the reasoning advanced in support of a CPPC contract, stating,
in part, as follows:
Congress, no doubt anticipating that learned, technical and weird definitions of
cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost contracts would follow a prohibition of a par-
ticular species of such contracts, wisely broadened the prohibition to extend to
all transactions in which the system was used. What was the "system" and
what was the vice to be eliminated? The system was the method of contracting
whereby the Government agent's profit or compensation was increased in direct
proportion to the cost of the object or commodity itself to the Government.
The vice was the temptation, oftentimes not resisted, to deliberately or carelessly
cause or permit the cost of the object to be increased in order to increase the
profit.
In the Blumenthal-Kahn case, the presence of a maximum price
does not cancel the fact that the contract was on a CPPC basis and
the final reimbursement to the contractor was in the form of cost,
plus a profit based on a percentage of such cost. Clearly, aside from
the question of reasonableness, this constituted a CPPC system of
contracting. The only effect of a "ceiling" price is to restrict the
maximum beyond which the "evils" of a CPPC system of contract-
ing cannot exceed; it does not do away with such "evils" prior to
the point at which the maximum price is reached. Assuming, how-
ever, for the sake of argument that the presence of a "ceiling" price
and other controls insured the reasonableness of the final cost of the
contract and therefore made it valid, this theory if applied to Day
and Zimmerman's subcontract would result in its being considered
valid, because the cost of the subcontract had been audited and certi-
fied by the War Department as being in the best interests of the
Government.
The decision in the Day and Zimmerman case rests strongly on
the assumption that if subcontracts are not covered, the prohibition
against the CPPC form of contracting could be substantially evaded
and the purposes thereof defeated. This argument is faulty because
it does not take into consideration the fact that all CPFF prime con-
tracts provide that the Government will only reimburse the contrac-
1245 F. Supp. 1016 (D. C. 1942).
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tor for reasonable costs incurred in the performance of the contract.
There is, therefore, ample authority on the part of the Government to
disallow unreasonable costs or profits earned under CPPC subcon-
tracts without resorting to the necessity of reading into the law a
provision with respect to subcontracts which does not appear therein.
By disallowing the portion of a CPPC subcontract considered un-
reasonable, the original purpose of Congress will have been fulfilled.
The disallowance of the entire amount of subcontracts solely because
they are on a CPPC basis, without any consideration of the value of
the goods and services rendered the Government, would be taking
advantage of a technicality in direct violation of the trust relationship
inherent in every CPFF prime contract.
Congress has repeatedly recognized that the present emergency
involving our national defense, calls for a high degree of cooperative
confidence and trust by each contracting party in the other to insure
the successful accomplishment of vital war contracts. This policy is
expressed in the Contract Settlement Act of 1944,13 wherein it is
provided that "Whenever any formal or technical defects or omission
in any prime contract, or in any grant of authority to an officer or
agent of a contracting agency who ordered any materials, services,
and facilities might invalidate the contract or commitment, the con-
tracting agency (1) shall not take advantage of such defect or omis-
sion; (2) shall amend, confirm, or ratify such contract or commit-
ment without consideration in order to cure such defect or omission;
and (3) shall make a fair settlement of any obligation thereby created
or incurred by such agency, whether expressed or implied, in fact or
in law, or in the nature of an implied or quasi contract."
If the Comptroller General's decision in the Day and Zinmwrmnan
case were applied to the numerous subcontracts entered into on a
CPPC basis, the Government would be prohibited from reimbursing
contractors for any portion of the cost of such subcontracts regardless
of the fact that the prices were reasonable and that the goods had
been received and used by the Government. Unless the decision in
the Day and Zimnerman case is Teversed, war contractors will sus-
tain a loss of millions of dollars, in direct violation of the expressed
intent of Congress-to conduct war contracting on a fair and equitable
basis.
RAPHAEL j. MUSICUS.
THE DOCTRINE OF "THE LAST CLEAR CHANCE"
As an outgrowth of society's high regard for persons and prop-
erty, the doctrine of "the last clear chance" was formulated in Eng-
land and later adopted by the courts of the United States. In effect,
the rule prescribes a course of conduct demanded by society when
situations arise wherein one of its members, through negligence or
23 PUBLIC LAW 395, 78th Cong., c. 358, 2d Sess.
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